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I. INTRODUCTION
Municipal1 debt financing has received considerable attention
at the federal,2 state,3 and local levels since Cleveland's bond de-
fault and New York City's financial crisis.4 The tax revolt of the
1970's,5 characterized by Proposition 13,6 exacerbated the fiscal
problems of local governments by restricting the use of debt
financing devices supported by property taxes. The turbulence of
that decade extended into the 1980's with an unprecedented down-
turn in the bond market,7 a primary source of debt financing.8 At-
* J.D., 1984, University of Florida.
1. For purposes of discussion, counties, cities, towns, school districts, and special dis-
tricts are included under the heading of "municipal."
2. See, e.g., JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., CHANGING CONDITIONS IN THE
MARKET FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEBT 1 (Joint Comm. Print 1976) (prepared by
John Peterson) [hereinafter cited as CHANGING CONDITIONS].
3. See, e.g., FLORIDA ADVISORY COUNCIL ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, LOCAL Gov-
ERNMENT DEBT IN FLORIDA (Mar. 1979) [hereinafter cited as ACIR, FLA. LOCAL DEBT].
4. For a discussion of the 1975 fiscal crisis of New York City, see Gelfand, Seeking
Local Government Financial Integrity Through Debt Ceilings, Tax Limitations, and Ex-
penditure Limits: The New York City Fiscal Crisis, The Taxpayer's Revolt, and Beyond,
63 MINN. L. REV. 545, 555-75 (1979); Shalala & Bellamy, A State Saves a City: The New
York Case, 1976 DUKE L.J. 1119; New York City-What Lies Ahead?, 12 COLUM. J.L. &
Soc. PROBS. 587 (1976) (symposium).
5. See Sound and Fury over Taxes, TIME, June 29, 1978, at 12.
6. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA. For an analysis of the changes resulting from the amend-
ment, see Amador Valley Joint Union High School Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 22 Cal.
3d 208, 583 P.2d 1281, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239 (1978).
7. See Wall St. J., Feb. 28, 1980, at 1, col. 6.
8. It has been estimated that local governments use municipal bonds to finance 50 to
60% of their capital projects. Bagwell, Evans & Nielsen, The Municipal Bond Market: An
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tempts to quell this turbulence in municipal finance have often fo-
cused upon a single fiscal control, while neglecting needed reform
of the overall municipal financing system.
Local governments incur debt by two methods: short-term or
long-term borrowing.' Short-term borrowing alleviates temporary
cash flow gaps between annual revenues and daily expenditures. 10
Municipalities issue short-term notes," under one year in matur-
ity, primarily to cover operating and maintenance expenses. 2
Long-term borrowing, over one year in maturity, provides the
financing for capital projects."3 Local governments levy taxes to ob-
tain the funds for repayment of the long-term loans over the life of
the project.
14
Several rationales support the use of long-term debt financing.
Capital expenditures arise irregularly and are not easily financed
from current revenues.' 5 Capital projects, such as school buildings
and utility systems, have a useful life of many years. If a school
district accumulates tax revenues for a period of years before
purchasing a capital item, many persons who contributed the reve-
Analysis and Suggested Reform, 16 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 211, 211, 212 n.2 (1979).
9. Greenberg, Municipal Securities: Some Basic Principles and Practices, 9 URB. LAW.
338, 340-50 (1977).
10. Id. at 346-47.
11. The following are various types of short-term notes issued by local governments.
Tax anticipation notes (TANs) are issued in anticipation of receiving specific taxes and are
paid out of those receipts. TANs enable local governments to borrow against expected taxes
to fund current operating expenses. Id. at 347. Revenue anticipation notes (RANs) are is-
sued in anticipation of other sources of future revenue. Typically, the revenues are utility
revenues, or federal and state aid. Id. at 348. Bond anticipation notes (BANs) are a means
of interim financing until a long-term bond issue can be floated. BANs may only be issued
after the long-term bonds have been authorized. Id. General obligation notes, used for the
same purposes as TANs and RANs, are the equivalent in credit quality of general obligation
bonds. PUBLIC SECURITIES ASS'N, FUNDAMENTALS OF MUNICIPAL BONDS 19 (rev. ed. 1982).
12. Greenberg, supra note 9, at 347. Short-term borrowing is occasionally used for in-
terim financing of capital projects when long-term interest rates are prohibitively high. The
issuer hopes that lower long-term rates will be available when the short-term notes mature.
Id.
13. U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
AND STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEBT 6 (Sept. 1961) [hereinafter cited
as ACIR, LOCAL DEBT]. Long-term borrowing supplied $39 billion of the $62 billion spent by
local governments on capital outlays from 1952 to 1960. The remaining one-third of the
financing for capital outlays, or expenditures for construction and purchase of land and
equipment, apparently came from current revenues. Id.
14. 15 E. MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 43.02 (3d ed. 1970).
Bonds, the primary form of long-term borrowing, generally have a 10 to 30-year maturity.
This distributes the cost of local government expenditures over the life of the bonds, rather
than requiring local governments to levy taxes for a lump sum payment of the debt when it
is created. Id.
15. ACIR, LOCAL DEBT, supra note 13, at 9.
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nues will have moved and will not benefit from the purchase.",
Those who move into the community after the item is purchased
will have the benefit of the facilities without the burden of sharing
the acquisition costs. 7 By borrowing to finance construction and
then imposing a tax to repay the loan, those who benefit from the
new facilities will pay the tax. Furthermore, a capital project is
often instrumental in attracting new residents who will increase
the community's tax base." Moreover, a community with an ex-
panding tax base can better afford debt payments over time. 9
The state must expressly grant local governments the power to
incur debt.2 0 That power is generally subject to statutory and con-
stitutional restrictions.2 The primary objectives of debt restric-
tions are preventing corruption, discouraging extravagance, and
promoting sound fiscal policy for local governments. 2  The most
common constitutional debt restriction is the debt-to-property ra-
tio, which limits the amount of outstanding debt to a percentage of
the property tax base." Local governments in Florida, however, are
16. Id. at 10. According to Census Bureau statistics, approximately 20% of all Ameri-
cans change their residences each year, with one in sixteen moving across county lines. Such
population movements could have significant cumulative effects when measured over the life
of a local bond issue. Id.
17. The principle of "intergenerational equity" requires each generation of taxpayers to
pay for its "stream of use" of governmental facilities. Under this concept, one generation of
taxpayers should not utilize long-term borrowing to finance capital projects that will not
benefit the next generation, which must share the burden of financing. On the other hand,
the present generation should not bear the full burden of financing projects that will also.
benefit the next generation. Thus, present and future generations should share debt service
and depreciation costs in proportion to the benefit received. Gelfand, supra note 4, at 550-
51.
18. PUBLIC SECURITIES ASS'N, supra note 11, at 48.
19. Id. The "pay-as-you-use" approach represents a concept similar to that of "in-
tergenerational equity," namely, that taxpayers who benefit from new facilities should pay
for them over time. Id. In contrast to the "pay-as-you-use" approach is the "pay-as-you-
acquire" philosophy, which advocates immediate payment for new projects. Id. at 49. The
"pay-as-you-acquire" approach, often used in poor economic times, increases the taxpayers'
burden of both paying off past debt and financing facilities to be used in the future. ACIR,
LOCAL DEBT, supra note 13, at 11. For a discussion of the contrasts between the two ap-
proaches, see L. MOAK, ADMINISTRATION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEBT 192-95 (1970).
20. 15 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 14, at § 39.07.
21. See, e.g., ACIR, LOCAL DEBT, supra note 13, at 27-33; Bowers, Limitations on Mu-
nicipal Indebtedness, 5 VAND. L. REV. 37, 37-42 (1951); Morris, Evading Debt Limitations
with Public Building Authorities: The Costly Subversion of State Constitutions, 68 YALE
L.J. 234 (1958).
22. Bowmar, The Anachronism Called Debt Limitation, 52 IowA L. REV. 863, 867
(1967).
23. Bowers, supra note 21, at 37. Until recently, Virginia's constitution had the highest
percentage limit, at 18%, of any state employing a debt-to-property ratio. See VA. CONST.
art. VII, § 10 (1950, amended 1980); Bowmar, supra note 22, at 866 n.21. In 1980, the voters
19841
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not subject to such a ceiling on their indebtedness."'
A second method of regulating debt is the restriction of prop-
erty tax rates that can service the debt, or a limitation on property
tax rates as a whole.25 Section 9 of article VII of the Florida Con-
stitution 26 limits property tax rates by restricting the millage rate
at which counties, school districts, municipalities, and special dis-
tricts may levy ad valorem~taxes. Ad valorem taxes27 are levied at a
set millage rate on the assessed value of real estate and tangible
personal property. 28 A "mill" is equal to one-tenth of one cent.
29
The third method of regulating local debt is the requirement
of referendum approval of proposed municipal bond issues.3s Arti-
of Virginia amended their constitution and restricted the debt-incurring power of towns and
cities by substituting 10% for the 18% limit. See Act of Apr. 4, 1980, ch. 655, 1980 Va. Acts
991; S.J. Res. 29, ch. 764, 1980 Va. Acts 1465. New York's constitution has one of the most
detailed percentage limitations on local indebtedness. See N.Y. CONST. art. VIII, § 4. For
example, counties, cities with a population of less than 125,000, towns, and villages may not
contract indebtedness exceeding seven percent of the average full valuation of taxable real
estate. New York City and Nassau County are limited to 10%, and cities with over 125,000
inhabitants may not exceed nine percent. Id. Nationwide, the five-percent limitation seems
to be the most common percentage device. See, e.g., IowA CONST. art. XI, § 3; Wis. CONST.
art. XI, § 3. See generally ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, UNDER-
STANDING THE MARKET FOR STATE AND LOCAL DEBT 46-53 (May 1976) (summary of all state
constitutional and statutory percentage limitations on local government power to issue gen-
eral obligation long-term debt).
24. In 1929, the Florida Legislature considered a constitutional amendment forbidding
any county, district, or municipality to issue bonds if their indebtedness would then exceed
20% of the assessed value of taxable property within the locale. This 20% debt-to-property
ratio limitation was subsequently stricken from the proposed amendment. S.J. Res. 26, FLA.
S. JOUR., 1929 Reg. Sess. at 272.
25. ACIR, LOCAL DEBT, supra note 13, at 30; see, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-301
(1980); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 6-1.1-19-1 to .1-19-2 (Burns 1984); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 79-5001 to
-5015 (1978); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 70.62(4) (West Supp. 1982-1983).
26. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 9 provides in part:
(b) Ad valorem taxes, exclusive of taxes levied for the payment of bonds and
taxes levied for periods not longer than two years when authorized by vote of the
electors who are the owners of freeholds therein not wholly exempt from taxa-
tion, shall not be levied in excess of the following millages upon the assessed
value of real estate and tangible personal property: for all county purposes, ten
mills; for all school purposes, ten mills ....
27. The phrase "ad valorem tax" may be used interchangeably with "property tax."
FLA. STAT. § 192.001(1) (1983).
28. See FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 9(b).
29. FLA. STAT. § 192.001(10) (1983).
30. See, e.g., ARK. CONST. art. XVI, § 1 (cities may use debt financing only with ap-
proval of a majority of the voters in those cities); IDAHO CONST. art. VIiI, § 3 (any indebted-
ness exceeding the annual income and revenue received by the county or municipality re-
quires two-thirds majority approval); LA. CONST. art. VI, § 33(A) (general obligation bonds
require approval of both a majority of voters and the State Bond Commission); N.C. CONST.
art. V, § 4.
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cle VII, section 12 of the Florida Constitutions1 imposes this refer-
endum requirement to control local government borrowing. There
are, however, reasons to doubt the continuing efficacy of the refer-
endum as a method of restricting local governments' incurrence of
debt. The history of the referendum requirement exposes the
problems that have emerged in defining and implementing consti-
tutional restrictions on local government financing. This article fo-
cuses on the referendum requirement and the judicially-developed
revenue bond exception to that requirement. Analysis of the
problems arising from this constitutional restriction and its excep-
tion is followed by suggestions for alternative means of regulating
local government debt.
II. DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN GENERAL OBLIGATION AND REVENUE
BONDS
A. Overview of Municipal Bonds
Local government debt has increased rapidly over the last cen-
tury,32 with primary reliance today on the municipal bond market
to finance that debt.3 3 Currently, local governments finance fifty to
sixty percent of capital projects through the sale of municipal
bonds." The development and sale of a municipal bond issue re-
quires the expertise of financial advisors, underwriters, dealers,
and bond counsel.3 5 The attractiveness of municipal bonds as a
financing device stems primarily from the fact that interest on the
bonds, unlike other securities, is exempt from federal income tax. 6
31. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 12. Section 12 provides:
Counties, school districts, municipalities, special districts and local governmental
bodies with taxing power may issue bonds, certificates of indebtedness or any
form of tax anticipation certificates, payable from ad valorem taxation and ma-
turing more than twelve months after issuance only:
(a) to finance or refinance capital projects authorized by law and only when
approved by vote of the electors who are owners of freeholds therein not wholly
exempt from taxation; or
(b) to refund outstanding bonds and interest and redemption premium
thereon at a lower net average interest cost rate.
32. MUNICIPAL FINANCE OFFICERS ASS'N, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT FISCAL ALMA-
NAC 126 (July 1982). The volume of state and municipal borrowing increased from $174
million in 1900 to $80 billion in 1981. The number of municipal bond issues increased from
2,312 to 6,652 during the same time period. Id.
33. Bagwell, Evans & Nielsen, supra note 8, at 211.
34. Id. at 211-12.
35. See infra notes 212-13 and accompanying text. See generally PUBLIC SECURITIES
AsS'N, supra note 11, at 29-40; L. MOAK, supra note 19, at 209-24 (discussion of securing
specialized services to assist in the planning and sale of bond issues).
36. See I.R.C. § 103(a)(1) (1982). Section 103 excludes from gross income the interest
1984]
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This tax exemption17 for municipal bonds stems from the constitu-
tional doctrine of "reciprocal immunity. 38 As a result, municipal
bond interest rates are generally thirty-five percent lower than
rates on comparable corporate securities.3 9 These lower interest
rates consequently reduce the municipalities' cost of borrowing
money.4 ° Investors are willing to receive the lower municipal yields
because of the tax exemption, which is especially advantageous to
investors in higher tax brackets.41
Once a local government decides to finance a project with
bonds, a bond validation proceeding is held in circuit court to de-
termine whether the bond resolution complies with Florida law.42
on "the obligations of a State, a Territory, or a possession of the United States, or any
political subdivision of any of the foregoing, or of the District-of Columbia." Arbitrage
bonds and various industrial development bonds, however, do not qualify for the exemption.
Article, Reform of the Municipal Bond Market: Alternatives to Tax-Exempt Financing, 15
COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 233 (1980). See generally Schilling, Griggs & Ebert, Wisconsin
Municipal Debt Finance: An Outlook for the Eighties, 63 MARQ. L. REV. 539, 576-80 (1980)
(discussing the federal tax exemption).
37. I.R.C. § 103(a)(1) (1982). This federal statutory exemption from taxation of interest
payments to municipal bondholders has limited judicial consideration of the reciprocal
immunity debate. But see Martori & Bliss, Taxation of Municipal Bond Inter-
est- "Interesting Speculation" and One Step Forward, 44 NOTRE DAME LAW. 191 (1968)
(discussing municipal securities that may be subject to taxation in the future). Municipal
bond interest is also exempt from state tax in Florida. FLA. STAT. § 159.15 (1983).
38. Under the reciprocal immunity doctrine, states are immune from federal interfer-
ence in state affairs, as the federal government is immune from state interference. PUBLIC
SECURITIES ASS'N, supra note 11, at 155. Beginning with McCullough v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316 (1819), the Supreme Court has held that federal and state governments have
reciprocal immunity from taxing each other. Proponents of the constitutional theory cite
Pollack v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895), which held that income tax on
interest from municipal bonds was unconstitutional. Opponents of the federal tax exemp-
tion argue that the subsequent enactment of the 16th amendment in 1913 rendered the
reciprocal immunity doctrine inapplicable, and that the federal government could tax mu-
nicipal interest. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVI; PUBLIC SECURITIES Ass'N, supra note 11, at
155-56.
39. PUBLIC SECURITIES Ass'N, supra note 11, at 34.
40. Id.
41. Id. For example, in 1980, a long-term municipal bond paid an interest rate of 8.45%
annually. To an unmarried investor in the 49% tax bracket, that tax-free municipal yield is
equivalent to a 16.57% return on a corporate bond. The single investor in a 30% tax bracket
would have to earn 12.07% on a comparable corporate bond to earn the same return as the
8.45% municipal bond. Id. There are three major categories of investors in municipal bonds:
commercial banks, fire and casualty insurance companies, and individuals. Generally, indi-
vidual investors in the 35% or higher tax brackets find municipal bonds attractive. Id. at 34.
For more information on the patterns of investment by the three major categories, see
CHANGING CONDITIONS, supra note 2, at 33-40.
42. FLA. STAT. § 75.01 (1983). The validation process begins when the issuer files a com-
plaint in the appropriate circuit court. Id. § 75.02 (1983). The complaint must allege the
issuer's authority to incur bonded debt, the results of any required election, the ordinance
and resolution authorizing the issue, the amount of the bonds, and the bonds' interest rate.
[Vol. 38:677
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The court makes findings on the questions of whether the issuing
body had the power to incur bonded debt and whether it exercised
that power in accordance with the law.43 The court may rot weigh
the fiscal feasibility of the proposed bonds in the validation deter-
mination. The circuit court judgment is final on all matters raised
or that could have been raised at the validation hearing, after time
for appeal to the Supreme Court of Florida has elapsed. 5 Consti-
tutional violations that were not raised during the validation pro-
ceeding, however, are not subject to this estoppel rule."
There are two basic types of municipal bonds: general obliga-
tion bonds and revenue bonds. General obligation bonds are
backed by the issuer's full faith and credit and taxing power. The
ad valorem tax is the most common source of revenue pledged for
repayment of general obligations bonds."s Revenue bonds are not
backed by the issuer's taxing power; they are secured by revenue
derived from rents, tolls, or charges paid from the facility con-
structed with the bond proceeds. 9
Id. § 75.04 (1984). Notice of the complaint must be published once a week for three consecu-
tive weeks. By this publication, property owners, taxpayers, and citizens of the issuing
county, municipality, or district are made defendants to the action. Id. § 75.06 (1983).
43. Town of Medley v. State, 162 So. 2d 257, 259 (Fla. 1964).
44. State v. Manatee County Port Auth., 171 So. 2d 169, 171 (Fla. 1965).
45. FLA. STAT. § 75.09 (1983). An appeal of the circuit court order for bond validations
is taken directly to the Florida Supreme Court. Id. § 75.08.
46. State v. Miami Beach Redev. Agency, 392 So. 2d 875, 895 (Fla. 1980); State ex rel.
Nuveen v. Greer, 88 Fla. 249, 259-60, 102 So. 739, 743 (1924); see Patterson, Legal Aspects
of Florida Municipal Bond Financing, 6 U. FLA. L. REV. 287, 289 (1953).
47. PUBLIC SECURITIES ASS'N, supra note 11, at 16. A third category, which will not be
discussed in this Article, is the hybrid bond. Hybrids, or double-barreled bonds, are revenue
bonds secured by an additional source of revenue or the issuer's full faith and credit. Id.
48. Greenberg, supra note 9, at 340.
49. Id. at 341-42. A growing area of revenue bond financing is the use of "industrial
development bonds" (IDBs). IDBs are issued by a governmental unit to aid private corpora-
tions in financing projects such as plant construction or pollution control facilities. Id. at
344. Several types of financing formats for IDBs are used in Florida. Pitcher, Use of Tax-
Exempt Municipal Bonds to Finance Private Projects in Florida, 56 FLA. B.J. 253, 253
(1982). Under one format, the bond proceeds are loaned by the municipality to the private
company. The company executes a promissory note with payments matching the bond
terms. The note is secured by a mortgage and security agreement between the issuer and the
company, and the lien is released when the bonds have been paid in full. Id. at 253-54.
Under the second arrangement, the municipality issues the bonds to construct the project,
which is then leased back to the company. Rental payments match the debt service, and the
company has an option to purchase the project for nominal consideration after the bonds
are paid. Id. at 254. The most common arrangement in Florida is the installment sales
agreement, under which title is retained by the governmental unit and transferred to the
company after the bonds are paid in full. Id. The Florida Legislature, by enacting the Flor-
ida Industrial Development Financing Act in 1980, significantly increased the types of
projects that can be financed in this manner. See FLA. STAT. §§ 159.25-.431 (1983). The
1984]
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Municipal bond investors generally rely on a bond's rating as
an indicator of its creditworthiness.50 The current reliance on de-
tailed credit analysis of bond issues stems from the weakened state
of municipal finance in the 1970's. General obligation bond analy-
sis concentrates on the issuer's financial health and potential tax-
ing power. This analysis includes such factors as outstanding debt,
property values, population, income, and unemployment statis-
tics. 1 Revenue bond analysis focuses less on the issuer and more
on the project to be financed, considering demand for services,
cost, operating efficiency, and competition.2 Revenue bonds are
generally scrutinized more carefully than general obligation bonds
to verify that the funds generated by the project will be sufficient
to cover operations, debt service, and reserve funds.5
B. Revenue Bonds-Judicial Exception to the Referendum
Requirement
Prior to 1930, the Florida Constitution contained no limitation
on the power of local governments to incur debt.54 Absent a statute
types of projects now eligible include industrial or manufacturing plants, tourism facilities,
trade centers, certain health care facilities, pollution control facilities, airports, commercial
projects in slum or blighted areas, and certain public lodging or restaurant facilities. Id. §
159.27(8)-(17), (19); see also Citrin & Schwartz, Industrial Revenue Bond Financing in
Florida, 55 FLA. B.J. 779, 779 (1981); Roberts, Industrial Development Bond Financing:
Section 103(b) Examined, 32 U. FLA. L. REV. 1 (1979).
50. Two major commercial services give nationally recognized ratings-Moody's Inves-
tors Service and Standard & Poor's Corporation. The services update an issuer's credit file
or compile new information after learning of an impending bond issue. A staff of regional
analysts recommend a rating after evaluating the issuer's budgets, financial reports, pro-
spectus materials, and completed questionnaires. A committee of senior analysts must ap-
prove this recommendation before release of the final rating, which occurs about a week
before the bond is to be sold. The final rating places the bonds in one of seven categories,
ranging from Aaa (prime quality) to Ca,C (default). Bagwell, Evans & Nielsen, supra note 8,
at 232-33. For more information on the process of rating, see TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND
TASK FORCE ON MUNICIPAL BOND CREDIT RATINGS, THE RATING GAME (1974).
51. PUBLIC SECURITIES ASS'N, supra note 11, at 114-15.
52. Id. at 125.
53. Id. at 126-27.
54. Earlier Florida constitutions did, however, regulate the power of the State to incur
debt. Article XII, section 7 of the 1868 constitution provided, "The Legislature shall have
power to provide for issuing State bonds bearing interest, for securing the debt [of the
State], and for the erection of State buildings, support of State institutions, and perfecting
public works." FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. XII, § 7. This provision was substantially narrowed
by the 1885 constitution, which limited the purposes for which state bonds could be issued
to repelling invasion, suppressing insurrection, and refunding existing indebtedness. FLA.
CONST. of 1885, art. IX, § 6. Today state general obligation bonds may be issued to finance
state capital projects upon approval of the electors. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 11(a). In addi-
tion, the state may finance capital projects through revenue bonds, which do not require
[Vol. 38:677
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to the contrary, courts upheld the legislature's power to authorize a
city to issue bonds without voter approval. 5 During the 1920's,
Florida experienced rapid growth 56  and local indebtedness in-
creased to finance needed public facilities .5  Ad valorem taxes se-
cured the bonds, and real estate speculation inflated property valu-
ations.5 The bust of the land boom,59 followed by the Great
Depression, led to widespread bond defaults among local govern-
ments in Florida during the late 1920's and early 1930's."
To prevent future financial debacles, article IX, section 6 of
the 1885 Florida Constitution was amended in 1930.61 The amend-
ment provided that local governmental units could issue bonds
only if approved by a majority vote in an election in which a ma-
voter approval, provided state taxes are not pledged as security. Id. § 11(c). See generally
Herring & Miller, Florida Public Bond Financing-Comments on the Constitutional As-
pects, 21 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 4-6 (1966) (sketch of Florida bond history); Patterson, supra
note 46, at 291-305 (discussing history of state bonds).
55. ACIR, FLA. LOCAL DEBT, supra note 3, at 91; see, e.g., Camp v. State, 71 Fla. 381,
386, 72 So. 483, 485 (1916); Middleton v. City of St. Augustine, 42 Fla. 287, 322, 29 So. 421,
431 (1900).
56. ACIR, FLA. LOCAL DEBT, supra note 3, at 91. Florida's population expanded from
less than one million in 1920 to 1,468,211 in 1930, a 51% increase.
57. Id. at 6. Between 1925 and 1926, Florida's local governmental debt increased over
50% in one year. Between 1922 and 1926, per capita debt increased by 257%. Id. The
amount of local bonds outstanding in Florida increased from $86 million to $532 million
from 1922 to 1931. Id. at 7.
58. Id. at 92.
59. The Florida real estate market began to fail in 1925. Several hurricanes and the
Mediterranean fruit fly infestation worsened the effect of the real estate collapse. Id.
60. A. HILLHOUSE, MUNICIPAL BONDS 24-27, 83-87 (1936). By 1936, Florida led the na-
tion with a total of 621 bond defaults. Defaults occurred in 47 out of 67 Florida counties and
in 204 out of 514 municipalities. Id. at 25-26.
61. See FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. IX, § 6 (1930). That provision provided in part:
[T]he Counties, Districts, or Municipalities of the State of Florida shall have
power to issue bonds only after the same shall have been approved by a majority
of the votes cast in an election in which a majority of the freeholders who are
qualified electors residing in such Counties, Districts or Municipalities shall par-
ticipate, to be held in the manner to be prescribed by law . ...
Due to Florida's boom and bust prior to the Depression, local government's fiscal ills were
diagnosed early and the legislature started amendment proceedings in 1929. See S.J. Res.
26, FLA. S. JOUR., 1929 Reg. Sess. at 272. The economic distress of local governments was
reflected in the 1929 Governor's Message to the 22d Legislative Assembly of Florida. Gover-
nor Doyle E. Carlton identified finance and taxation as the uppermost problem, stating:
Abnormal conditions resulting from the boom left their mark on public as
well as private life to such an extent as to endanger our financial security . . ..
In spite of high taxes, so high that many have ceased to pay, bond defaults are
imminent in towns, districts and counties throughout the State. "Unwise," some-
one says, to release this information. But it is folly to dodge facts which will
ultimately force their attention.
FLA. S. JOUR., 1929 Reg. Sess. at 3.
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jority of freeholders participated.6 2 The rationale for the amend-
ment was that freeholders, whose property would be taxed in order
to repay the debt, should have the right to decide whether the debt
should be incurred.
6 3
The 1930 amendment referred only to the issuance of "bonds,"
and made no distinction between general obligation and revenue
bonds." Early in the amendment's history, however, the Supreme
Court of Florida began to distinguish between types of local
government financing, and held that revenue bonds were not
"bonds" within the meaning of the referendum requirement.6 5 The
court introduced this "revenue bond exception" to the referendum
requirement in the 1933 case of State v. City of Miami.6
In State v. City of Miami, the city proposed to finance addi-
tions to its water supply system by issuing water revenue certifi-
cates payable from future net revenues of the water system. 7 The
Supreme Court of Florida acknowledged the long-established mu-
nicipal practice of owning public utilities and reasoned that be-
cause the legislature and the voters knew of this practice when
they adopted the amendment, the referendum requirement was in-
applicable to the municipal financing required to keep such utili-
ties in operation.6 8 The court concluded that such revenue certifi-
cates were not "bonds" within the meaning of the constitutional
62. FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. IX, § 6 (1930). Initially, bond elections had to be held at
the same time as other political elections; therefore, a majority of the registered freeholders
generally participated. See 1931 Fla. Laws, ch. 14715, § 9 (repealed 1951). Soon, freeholders
discovered that they could defeat a bond proposal by remaining away from the polls and
preventing participation by a majority of freeholders. To prevent this, the Florida Legisla-
ture authorized county commissioners "at any time" to require re-registration of freeholders
to secure an up-to-date list before the bond election. 1951 Fla. Laws, ch. 26870, § 9 (re-
pealed 1969).
63. E.g., State v. Halifax Hospital Dist., 159 So. 2d 231, 235 (Fla. 1963); State v. Florida
State Improvement Comm'n, 60 So. 2d 747, 751 (Fla. 1952); State v. Hillsborough County,
148 Fla. 163, 169, 3 So. 2d 882, 885 (1941); Williams v. Town of Dunnellon, 125 Fla. 114,
122, 169 So. 631, 635 (1936); Sullivan v. City of Tampa, 101 Fla. 298, 314, 134 So. 211, 217
(1931).
64. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
65. See, e.g., Brooks v. City of Jacksonville, 127 Fla. 564, 173 So. 365 (1937); Williams
v. Town of Dunnellon, 125 Fla. 114, 169 So. 631 (1936); Hopkins v. Baldwin, 123 Fla. 649,
167 So. 677 (1936); State v. City of Miami, 113 Fla. 280, 152 So. 6 (1933).
66. 113 Fla. 280, 152 So. 6 (1933).
67. Id. at 282, 152 So. at 7. The water revenue certificates were to be financed from net
revenues of the combined present water supply system and the proposed improvements. Id.
68. Id. at 295-96, 152 So. at 12. The supreme court cited numerous cases from other
states that represented three approaches to determining what constitutes a municipal bond
within the meaning of article IX, section 6. The court did not, however, attempt to reconcile
the different approaches, and declined to define the precise scope of the constitutional refer-
endum provision. See id. at 293, 152 So. at 9-11.
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amendment so long as the financing was based on utility revenues
rather than on ad valorem taxes.69
At first, the revenue bond exception applied only to bonds
that financed improvements to or expansions of existing public
utilities. 70 Subsequent judicial decisions approved the use of reve-
nue bonds to finance new projects as well, provided the revenue
generated from user fees would be sufficient to repay the bond-
holders. 7 1 Eventually, the exception expanded to encompass any
capital project financed by revenue bonds payable not only from
user fees, but from other non-ad valorem sources as well.72 Non-ad
valorem sources that have been held properly pledged for the re-
tirement of revenue bonds include cigarette taxes,73 utility service
taxes,7 4 bridge tolls, 75 license and franchise fees, 76 and race track
and jai alai funds.7 7 The supreme court has repeatedly held that
when revenue bonds were "payable solely from revenues derived
from utilities service, excise taxes, licenses or some other source
69. See id. at 300, 152 So. at 13.
70. See Williams v. Town of Dunnellon, 125 Fla. 114, 169 So. 631 (1936). The court
stated in Williams that any instruments to finance new projects with revenues from an
existing facility would be "bonds" and would require voter approval. Id. at 127, 169 So. at
635.
71. See, e.g., State v. City of Miami, 72 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 1954) (construction of ware-
house with bonds secured by lease payments); State v. City of Key West, 153 Fla. 226, 14
So. 2d 707 (1943) (purchase of new electric system with bonds payable from net revenue of
the system); State v. Dade County, 146 Fla. 331, 200 So. 848 (1941) (construction of cause-
way with causeway revenue bonds); State v. City of Hollywood, 131 Fla. 584, 179 So. 721
(1938) (erection of new waterworks with water revenue bonds); Flint v. Duval County, 126
Fla. 18, 170 So. 587 (1936) (construction of additional bridge with tolls from existing
bridge).
72. See State v. Alachua County, 335 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 1976) (state revenue-sharing and
race track funds used for public improvement bonds); State v. Orange County, 281 So. 2d
310 (Fla. 1973) (race track and jai alai funds pledged for capital improvement bonds); State
v. City of Boca Raton, 172 So. 2d 230 (Fla. 1965) (recreation facilities, city waste dump, and
street improvements to be financed by revenue bonds backed by cigarette, franchise, and
utility service taxes); State v. City of Coral Gables, 72 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 1954) (storm sewer
bonds secured by cigarette taxes).
73. See, e.g., Panama City v. State, 93 So. 2d 608 (Fla. 1957); Welker v. State, 93 So. 2d
591 (Fla. 1957); State v. City of Coral Gables, 72 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 1954).
74. See, e.g., Town of Medley v. State, 162 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1964); State v. City of
Tampa, 95 So. 2d 409 (Fla. 1957); State v. Monroe County, 81 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 1955);
Schmeller v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 38 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 1948).
75. See, e.g., Lee County v. State, 370 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1979); Sanibel-Captiva Taxpayer's
Ass'n v. County of Lee, 132 So. 2d 334 (Fla. 1961); Flint v. Duval County, 126 Fla. 18, 170
So. 587 (1936).
76. See, e.g., Panama City v. State, 93 So. 2d 608 (Fla. 1957); State v. Monroe County,
81 So. 2d 552 (Fla. 1955); State v. City of Miami, 76 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 1954).
77. See, e.g., State v. Orange County, 281 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 1973); State v. Manatee
County Port Auth., 171 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1965).
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than ad valorem taxes," they could be issued without referendum
approval.
78
The court's expansion of the revenue bond exception to allow
pledging a wider variety of non-ad valorem funds resulted at the
same time as an increase in local governments' non-ad valorem
revenues. When the referendum requirement was first enacted, ad
valorem taxes were almost the exclusive source of municipal reve-
nue. 79 Today, however, ad valorem taxes account for only twenty-
five percent of the total revenue of local governments." Accompa-
nying this decrease in the proportion of ad valorem taxes was an
increase in the proportion of non-ad valorem taxes and revenues.81
The expanding sources of non-ad valorem revenue made revenue
bond financing even more attractive to local governments seeking
to avoid the referendum required for general obligation bonds.
As local governments increasingly pledge non-ad valorem reve-
nues to repay revenue bonds, arguments were raised that the ad
valorem taxing power was being pledged indirectly. 2 In Town of
78. State v. City of Jacksonville, 53 So. 2d 306, 308 (Fla. 1951); see, e.g., State v. Tampa
Sports Auth., 188 So. 2d 795, 797 (Fla. 1966); State v. Monroe County, 81 So. 2d 522, 523
(Fla. 1955); State v. City of Jacksonville, 53 So. 2d 306, 308 (Fla. 1951).
79. ACIR, LOCAL DEBT, supra note 13, at 42-43. In 1902, property taxes accounted for
75% of all general revenue of local governments in the United States. By 1952, the property
tax proportion shifted to less than 50% of general revenue. Id.
80. Advisory Council on Intergovernmental Relations, FISCAL CAPACITY OF LOCAL Gov-
ERNMENT IN FLORIDA AN INFORMATIONAL REPORT 14 (Oct. 1978) [hereinafter cited as ACIR,
FISCAL CAPACITY]. In the fiscal year 1976-1977, the percentage distribution of local govern-
ment revenue for all local governments was as follows: property tax, 24.8%; utility tax,
2.4%; other taxes, 2.2%; utility revenue, 13.9%; federal intergovernmental revenue, 12.6%;
state intergovernmental revenue, 25.1%; and other revenue, 19.0%. Id. Property taxes pro-
vided 34% of total revenue in counties and 15.3% in municipalities. Id.
81. Id. The largest percentage increases in local government revenue are from federal
and state shared revenues. Id. These non-ad valorem funds come from various tax and reve-
nue sources. For example, counties may levy the following non-ad valorem taxes: the occu-
pational license tax, FLA. STAT. § 205.032 (1983); the optional one-cent motor fuel tax (if
approved by referendum), id. § 336.021; and the optional tourist development tax (requires
referendum approval), id. § 125.0104. Municipalities may levy the following non-ad valorem
taxes: municipal public service (utilities) tax, id. §§ 166.231-.232; the occupational license
tax, id. § 205.042; and the insurance premium tax, id. §§ 175.101, 185.08. Sources of non-ad
valorem revenue for local governments not derived from taxes include franchise, utility, and
intergovernmental revenues. ACIR, FISCAL CAPACITY, supra note 80, at 42-46. Miscellaneous
non-ad valorem revenue sources include hospital and transportation charges, fines and for-
feitures, school lunch sales, interest earnings, and special assessments. Id. at 46.
82. See Welker v. State, 93 So. 2d 591, 593 (Fla. 1957). In Welker, taxpayers argued
that by pledging excise taxes to secure revenue bonds, the municipality was indirectly plac-
ing an additional burden on ad valorem taxpayers. The taxpayers argued that because excise
taxes were being put to such a use, ad valorem taxes had to be used for general operations
which otherwise would have been financed by excise taxes. The supreme court called the
argument "strong and persuasive," but nevertheless held that the pledge of excise taxes did
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Medley v. State,3 the state raised such an objection to the valida-
tion of revenue bonds supported by water system revenues, ciga-
rette taxes, franchise taxes on electric power, utility taxes, and oc-
cupational license taxes. The state argued that real property was
being taxed to operate the water system and to replace those non-
ad valorem revenues that would be available for town expenses.
84
The supreme court noted that when non-ad valorem funds were
diverted from operating costs to revenue bond payments, ad
valorem taxes would probably have to be increased to cover the
deficiency in operating expenses.8 5 Nevertheless, the majority held
this "incidental effect on the use of the ad valorem taxing power"
did not necessitate a referendum."6 The court reasoned that the
constitutional provision was never intended to require voter ap-
proval for pledging non-ad valorem revenue previously used for op-
erating expenses."s The court ruled that only bonds that "directly
obligate the ad valorem taxing power" require approval by
referendum."s
The state also argued in Medley that the bonds were not eco-
nomically feasible. 9 The court reiterated its consistent rulings9"
that business judgments were the responsibility of the issuer and
thus beyond judicial interference. 1 The issues in a bond validation
proceeding were limited to determining whether the issuer had the
power to act and whether it exercised that power lawfully.92 Con-
cluding that the town had met this bifurcated validation test, the
Medley majority approved the validation of the bonds.
not require voter approval. Id.; accord Panama City v. State, 93 So. 2d 608, 614 (Fla. 1957).
83. 162 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1964).
84. Id. at 258. The state was the only party to file an answer objecting to the town's
bond proposal. Id. The state attorney is required to examine the issuer's complaint in the
bond validation proceeding and make objections to any procedural, informational, or other
errors in the complaint. FLA. STAT. § 75.05 (1983).
85. 162 So. 2d at 258.
86. Id.
87. See id.
88. Id.; accord State v. Alachua County, 335 So. 2d 554, 558 (Fla. 1976); State v. Tampa
Sports Auth., 188 So. 2d 795, 797-98 (Fla. 1966); Rianhard v. Port of Palm Beach Dist., 186
So. 2d 503, 506 (Fla. 1966).
89. 162 So. 2d at 258.
90. E.g., State v. Dade County, 142 So. 2d 79, 89 (Fla. 1962); State v. Florida State
Turnpike Auth., 134 So. 2d 12, 22 (Fla. 1961); State v. City of Daytona Beach, 118 Fla. 29,
41-42, 158 So. 300, 305 (1934).
91. 162 So. 2d at 259. The court recognized that the town had issued the bonds without
advice of a fiscal agent. The majority recognized that, although "good business practice dic-
tates that a city obtain such advice before contracting to sell its bonds," there was no legal
requirement that it do so. Id.
92. Id.
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Subsequent supreme court decisions have followed the Medley
test for validating revenue bonds. If the bonds do not directly obli-
gate the ad valorem taxing power, though they could have an inci-
dental effect on its use, the court has not required a referendum. 3
In contrast, the supreme court has refused to validate revenue
bonds backed by gross revenues from the project to be financed
coupled with a supporting pledge of ad valorem taxes. 4 For exam-
ple, in State v. Halifax Hospital District,95 hospital gross revenues
were pledged for the repayment of principal and interest on reve-
nue bonds issued to finance hospital improvements. In addition,
the authorizing resolution pledged to maintain during the life of
the bonds the assessed ad valorem tax at the time of issuance for
operation and maintenance of the hospital. 6 The supreme court
reasoned that the ad valorem tax would have to be levied in order
to operate the hospital that was generating the gross revenues for
bond payments. 7 The court found that, despite the terms of the
resolution, the bondholders could effectively compel the exercise of
the ad valorem taxing power.98 Granting this power to bondholders
was in effect an indirect pledge of ad valorem taxes, and thus voter
approval was necessary. 99
The Halifax and Medley cases represent the supreme court's
attempt to distinguish the referendum requirement for general ob-
ligation bonds and the revenue bond exception. There is a clear
93. See State v. Miami Beach Redev. Agency, 392 So. 2d 875, 898 (Fla. 1980); State v.
Alachua County, 335 So. 2d 554, 558 (Fla. 1976); State v. Tampa Sports Auth., 188 So. 2d
795, 797 (Fla. 1966); Rianhard v. Port of Palm Beach Dist., 186 So. 2d 503, 506 (Fla. 1966).
94. See State v. City of West Palm Beach, 125 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 1960) (city may issue
parking facility revenue bonds, provided that ad valorem taxes are not used to compensate
for any deficits in revenues from the facility); State v. County of Manatee, 93 So. 2d 381
(Fla. 1957) (invalidating a limited pledge of ad valorem taxes supplementing hospital im-
provement bonds).
95. 159 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1963).
96. Id. at 231-32. The ad valorem levy for operation and maintenance of the hospital
was four mills. The authorizing resolution provided for the deposit of the ad valorem levy in
an operating fund. Id. Usually, a revenue bond resolution establishes the order in which
funds generated by the project will be allocated. PUBLIC SECURITIES Ass'N, supra note 11, at
126. The funds are typically used in this order: operations and maintenance, debt service,
debt service reserve fund, reserve maintenance fund, renewal and replacement fund, and
surplus fund. Id. at 126-27.
97. See 159 So. 2d at 233.
98. Id. at 232. The court stated that "any device whereby the exercise of the ad valorem
taxing power is pledged and can directly or indirectly be compelled to meet the obligation of
the securities is a 'bond' which requires freeholder approval." Id. (emphasis added). The
court noted that bondholders could enforce any covenants in the bond resolution, including
the obligatory commitment to levy the ad valorem tax. Id.
99. Id. at 232.
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line between "pure" general obligation bonds, pledging ad valorem
taxes, and "pure" revenue bonds, pledging user fees from the proj-
ect to be financed. The line is less clear, however, between general
obligation bonds and those revenue bonds that pledge not only
user fees but non-ad valorem sources as well. If the bonds have
only an incidental effect on the ad valorem taxing power, they fall
within the revenue bond exception. If the bonds indirectly pledge
ad valorem taxes, they are not within the revenue bond exception.
This line continues to be blurred because the supreme court has
never defined the difference between an incidental effect on and an
indirect pledge of the ad valorem taxing power.1"'
The supreme court has been more explicit in distinguishing
between general obligation and revenue bonds when mortgages are
given to secure a bond.101 For example, where a city proposed to
finance utility improvements with revenue bonds secured by both
utility revenues and a mortgage on the utility plant, the supreme
court held the bonds invalid. 0 2 The court, reasoning that the city
might be forced to use its taxing power to prevent foreclosure on
the plant, ordered a referendum. 10 3 Whether real or personal prop-
erty is involved, the court has consistently held that pledges of
mortgages require referendum approval.0 4 In effect, ad valorem
taxes are indirectly pledged, because a community might feel
"morally compelled" ' 5 to levy taxes to prevent the loss of assets
100. See State v. Miami Beach Redev. Agency, 392 So. 2d 875, 898 (Fla. 1980). Distin-
guishing between incidental effect and indirect pledge is even more difficult for the circuit
judge, who may not examine the fiscal feasibility of the proposed bonds. See supra note 44
and accompanying text.
101. See, e.g., Nohrr v. Brevard County Educ. Facilities Auth., 247 So. 2d 304, 311 (Fla.
1971); Hollywood v. Broward County, 90 So. 2d 47, 51 (Fla. 1956); State v. Florida State
Improvement Comm'n, 47 So. 2d 627, 631-32 (Fla. 1950).
102. Boykin v. Town of River Junction, 121 Fla. 902, 164 So. 558 (1935). The scheme
presented in Boykin was similar to that approved in State v. City of Miami-financing
expansions to an existing utility with future utility revenues. 113 Fla. 280, 152 So. 6 (1933);
see supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text. The fatal difference in Boykin was the addi-
tional pledge of a mortgage on the physical properties. 121 Fla. at 908-09, 164 So. at 560.
103. See 121 Fla. at 908-09, 164 So. at 561-62.
104. The courts usually have invalidated revenue bonds secured by mortgages on real
property. See supra note 101. The same principle is also applicable to personal property.
Betz v. Jacksonville Transp. Auth., 277 So. 2d 769 (Fla. 1973). In Betz, the court held that a
referendum was not required where management and bus system contracts created no lien
or mortgage on bus system properties to be purchased. Id. at 772. The issue is not whether
real or personal property is involved, but whether a government may be compelled to levy
taxes to prevent the loss of an asset through foreclosure proceedings.
105. Nohrr v. Brevard County Educ. Facilities Auth., 247 So. 2d 304, 311 (Fla. 1971).
For further discussion of the prohibition of pledging mortgages without voter approval, see
Op. AT'Y GEN. FLA. 76-121 (1976); Op. AT'Y GEN. FLA. 73-164 (1973).
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through a mortgage foreclosure.
Against this background of the revenue bond exception and its
restrictions, the Florida Constitution was revised in 1968. Section
12 of article VII now specifies that bonds "payable from ad
valorem taxation" are subject to freeholder approval.106 This limi-
tation on the scope of the referendum requirement is a ratification
of prior judicial interpretation of the revenue bond exception." 7
Section 12 applies to long-term bonds and limits the use of bonds
to financing only capital projects.10
The former requirement of majority approval in an election in
which a majority of qualified freeholders voted was changed to
simple majority approval.10 9 The freeholder requirement was de-
clared unconstitutional in 1979, when the United States Supreme
Court held that excluding nonfreeholders from general obligation
bond elections violates the equal protection clause of the United
States Constitution.110 Although the freeholder language remains
intact in section 12, the Florida Supreme Court has held that all
electors have the right to vote in a general obligation bond
referendum.1
106. See supra note 31.
107. In State v. Miami Beach Redev. Agency, 392 So. 2d 875, 898 (Fla. 1901), the Flor-
ida Supreme Court recognized that the 1968 revision was a ratification of the revenue bond
exception.
108. One of the contributing causes of New York City's 1975 fiscal crisis was the misuse
of long-term bonds. Bonds were used to finance non-capital projects such as manpower
training and vocational education, which consequently shifted many current expenses to the
capital budget. Shalala & Bellamy, supra note 4, at 1124-25. Section 12 of the Florida Con-
stitution protects against such abuses by allowing long-term borrowing for capital projects
only and not for current operating expenses. See FLA. CoNsT. art. VII, § 12.
109. After the 1930 amendment was enacted requiring approval by a majority of quali-
fied freeholders, many bond issues failed because of voter apathy. To overcome this problem
the legislature provided for re-registration of freeholders to determine the number qualified
to vote in a bond election. See supra note 62. In State v. City of St. Augustine, 235 So. 2d 1,
5 (Fla. 1970), the supreme court found that such "cumbersome and costly procedures"
caused by freeholder participation requirements of the 1885 constitution were intentionally
eliminated in the 1968 constitution. The Florida Supreme Court interpreted the voter re-
quirement as applicable to any freeholder elector whose property is .ubject to taxation for
any purpose. See id. at 7.
110. See City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970).
111. See State v. City of Miami, 260 So. 2d 497, 499 (Fla. 1972) (involving a bond elec-
tion in which freeholder and nonfreeholder votes were separately tallied). Phoenix was held
applicable to Florida local bond elections, and all votes were therefore valid. The two bond
proposals, totalling $27 million, were approved. Ironically, if the prior freeholder require-
ment had been controlling, both bond issues would have been defeated. Id. at 499.
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III. PROBLEMS ARISING FROM ARTICLE VII, SECTION 12
Courts and local governments have continued to carve out ex-
ceptions to the referendum requirement for municipal bonds." 2
Today, section 12 of article VII is an anachronism offering only
illusory protection against irresponsible long-term borrowing. The
original purpose of the referendum was to permit those whose
property would be encumbered to decide whether to incur the
debt."3 This purpose is no longer valid because bond elections are
open to all voters, regardless of freehold status."" Additionally, the
referendum's focus continues to be solely on the ad valorem tax,
which provides a much lower percentage of total local government
revenues than it did when the referendum requirement was en-
acted.1 5 Meanwhile, non-ad valorem sources, which account for a
proportionally larger part of total revenues, are not subject to the
constitutional referendum restriction."' The illusory nature of the
protection provided by section 12 is apparent in light of the widen-
ing scope of the revenue bond exception and its increased use in
financing both revenue generating and non-revenue generating fa-
112. In addition to the revenue bond exception, there was another category of local
borrowing classified as outside the meaning of "bonds" under the 1930 referendum require-
ment. Under this exception, counties were authorized to levy a 5 mill ad valorem "building
tax" to finance essential government buildings such as courthouses and jails. 1949 Fla. Laws,
ch. 25469, § 1; see, e.g., State v. County of Palm Beach, 89 So. 2d 607 (Fla. 1956) (permitting
revenue bond financing of county office building, delinquent children's home, and court-
house improvements without voter approval); Posey v. Wakulla County, 148 Fla. 115, 3 So.
2d 799 (1941) (construction of county courthouse with bonds secured by building tax); Ta-
pers v. Pichard, 124 Fla. 549, 169 So. 39 (1936) (revenue bonds secured by building tax to
finance jail were valid). But cf. Leon County v. State, 122 Fla. 505, 165 So. 666 (1936) (tax
anticipation certificates for future building taxes to construct a jail required voter approval).
See generally Patterson, supra note 46, at 306-08 (discussing the essential government
needs exception).
The essential government needs exception was rendered obsolete with the enactment of
section 12, article VII in 1968. In State v. County of Dade, 234 So. 2d 651 (Fla. 1970), the
Florida Supreme Court stated, "The present Constitution is clearly more restrictive and
expresses the will of the people that financial arrangements of the type formerly upheld in
the Tapers v. Pichard line of cases be no longer permitted." Id. at 653. The Florida Legisla-
ture subsequently repealed the statute authorizing the building tax. 1971 Fla. Laws 14, § 3.
113. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
114. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
116. Florida's Constitutional Revision Commission proposed a revision of section 12 of
article VII that would have included a revenue bond provision. Essentially, the provision
would have allowed revenue bonds to be issued without a vote of the electors to finance
fixed capital outlay projects authorized by law. This proposed constitutional revision was
defeated in a statewide election. See Greenfield, Flexibility and Fiscal Conservatism: Provi-
sions of the 1978 Constitutional Revision Relating to Bond Financing, 6 FLA. ST. U.L. REV.
822, 826 (1978).
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cilities. 1 7 While voters have a constitutional right to approve gen-
eral obligation bonds, they have no such right to vote on revenue
bonds, which account for seventy percent of municipal borrow-
ing. 18 Not only does the referendum requirement fail to provide
effective protection against fiscal irresponsibility, but it also re-
stricts the ability of local governments to develop responsible debt
management policies that efficiently utilize both revenue and gen-
eral obligation bonds. County of Volusia v. State"9 illustrates the
restrictive effect of section 12.
In Volusia County, federal court orders, mandates, and guide-
lines had been imposed on the county to alleviate overcrowding in
the county jail.1 2° The federal court intervention, however, offered
no solutions, and Volusia County struggled with the problem for
several years. 2' Because a jail is a non-revenue generating facility
that benefits the community as a whole, it is an appropriate proj-
ect for general obligation bond financing. On referendum, however,
Volusia County voters defeated the general obligation bond propo-
sal by an overwhelming majority.122 Next, pursuant to its home
rule charter power,12 the county enacted an ordinance 24 and reso-
lution'25 authorizing the issuance of revenue bonds secured by "all
legally available non-ad valorem funds" to finance a new jail.12 6 In-
117. See supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
118. ACIR, LOCAL DEaT, supra note 13, at 26.
119. 417 So. 2d 968 (Fla. 1982).
120. County of Volusia v. State, No. 82-2889-CA-01-8 (Fla. 7th Cir. Ct. Sept. 10, 1981).
A federal court order imposed on the county jail a temporary limitation of 192 occupants.
The jail was originally designed to hold 219 persons, but had an average prisoner population
of 368 and, under federal constitutional standards, should have held no more than 62. Id. at
2. To meet its remaining presentencing incarceration needs, Volusia County leased space in
the Daytona Beach and New Smyrna Beach city jails. Id. at 3.
121. In the language of the circuit court, the county has been confronted with "a series
of 'Hobson's Choices' as the problem has gotten progressively worse and the alternatives
fewer and exceedingly more expensive." Id. at 1. The court further recognized that the
county "has addressed this most perplexing and politically unpopular problem with courage,
imagination and practical application." Id. at 1-2. In 1979, Volusia County commissioned a
study that resulted in a recommendation to construct a new jail. Id. at 3.
122. Amicus Curiae Brief of Sarasota County at 2, County of Volusia v. State, 417 So.
2d 968 (Fla. 1982); see Orlando Sentinel, June 11, 1982, at A5, col. 1 (voters rejected a $35
million general obligation bond proposal in 1980).
123. See County of Volusia Home Rule Charter (1970), reprinted in 1970 Fla. Laws, ch.
70-966.
124. Volusia County, Fla., Ordinance No. 81-6 (Mar. 5, 1981).
125. Volusia County, Fla., Resolution No. 81-84 (July 9, 1981).
126. Id. § 12. Section 12 provided that a pledge of non-ad valorem funds would secure
the principal and interest of the revenue bonds. Non-ad valorem funds were defined to in-
clude "all legally available funds and revenues of the County collected by or accruing to the
County other than by the exercise of the ad valorem taxing power." Id. § 2F. The resolution
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cluded in the non-ad valorem revenues pledged were utility user
fees, building permits, other licenses and permits, county officer
fees, vehicle inspection fees, and other charges for services. 2 7 In
addition, the resolution stated that the county was obligated to
take all action necessary to continue receiving the non-ad valorem
funds for repayment of the bonds.12
At the validation proceeding, the circuit court rejected the
proposed bond issue.' 29 The court concluded that pledging regula-
tory and user fees to repay the revenue bonds was unlawful. 30
Analogizing to earlier "impact fee" cases,' 3 the court found that
fees collected to offset the costs of government regulation could not
be pledged for an unrelated use.3 2 With the exception of fees col-
authorized an issuance of $40 million in revenue bonds. Id. § 5.
127. County of Volusia v. State, No. 81-2889-CA-01-B, at 5-6 (Fla. 7th Cir. Ct. Sept. 10,
1981).
128. Volusia County, Fla., Resolution No. 81-64 at § 14H (July 9, 1981). Section 14H
provided in part:
The County will not take any action which will impair or adversely affect in
any manner the pledge of the non-ad valorem funds made herein or the rights of
the holders of the obligations issued pursuant to this resolution. The County
shall be unconditionally and irrevocably obligated, so long as any of the obliga-
tions or the interest thereon are outstanding and unpaid, to take all lawful ac-
tion necessary or required to continue to entitle the County to receive the non-
ad valorem funds in the maximum amounts as now provided by law to pay any
obligations referred to in section 2F hereof and the principal of and interest on
the obligations and to make the other payments provided for herein.
Id.
129. County of Volusia v. State, No. 81-2889-CA-01-B, at 30 (Fla. 7th Cir. Ct. Sept. 10,
1981).
130. See id. at 13-14.
131. Contractors & Builders Ass'n v. City of Dunedin, 329 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 1976); Brow-
ard County v. Janis Dev. Corp., 311 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). Local governments may
impose an impact fee to offset the necessary expense of regulation. This regulatory power is
derived from the police power of local government. Tamaimi Trail Tours, Inc. v. City of
Orlando, 120 So. 2d 170, 172 (Fla. 1960). The Florida Supreme Court distinguished a fee
from a tax in Bateman v. City of Winter Park, 160 Fla. 906, 37 So. 2d 362 (1948). A fee
imposed for regulatory purposes, which also requires compliance with statutory conditions,
is a valid fee. If the fee is exacted for revenue purposes, and payment gives the right to carry
on business without performance of any further conditions, it is a tax. Id. at 907, 37 So. 2d
at 363. In Janis, land developers challenged the validity of a land use fee that had to be
paid before they could build. The fee, ostensibly imposed for the purpose of building roads,
was held to be an invalid tax. 311 So. 2d at 375. The district court of appeal explained that
the fees exceeded any cost of regulation and were, therefore, invalid. Id. In Dunedin, build-
ing contractors and land owners challenged a municipal ordinance that authorized impact
fees for the privilege of connecting to the municipality's water and sewer system. The su-
preme court found that, while such fees were not taxes, the ordinance was defective for
failing to specify restrictions on the use of the collected fees. 329 So. 2d at 321.
132. County of Volusia v. State, No. 81-2889-CA-01-B, at 13 (Fla. 7th Cir. Ct. Sept. 10,
1981). In addition to the impact fee cases, the circuit court relied on McGovern v. Lee
County, 346 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 1977), for the principle that fees must bear a relationship to the
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lected by the sheriff's office and county court, the non-ad valorem
fees had no relation to financing a jail and were an "unlawful di-
version of funds. ' 133 Having ruled that a majority of the pledged
revenues were unlawful, the court then found that there would be
insufficient coverage of the proposed bonds."' Emphasizing the
substance rather than the form of the bonds, the court held that
the bond issue violated section 12 of article VII. 135 According to
the circuit court, pledging all gross non-ad valorem sources did not
have a merely incidental effect on ad valorem taxes, but directly
obligated the county to use its taxing power for repayment of the
bonds.
36
By a four to three vote, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed
the circuit court order denying validation of the proposed bonds. '37
The majority noted that the Town of Medley had approved non-ad
valorem pledges without referendum even though such pledges
would have an incidental effect on the ad valorem taxing power.
1 38
Nonetheless, the court distinguished the Volusia County bonds
from those involved in Medley on two grounds: first, Volusia
County had pledged all legally available non-ad valorem revenues,
instead of several specific sources; and second, the resolution
pledged to maintain fully the programs and services that generated
cost of the regulation involved. If there is no such relationship, the fees are revenue produc-
ing taxes. Because there is no statutory authority to levy such taxes, they are invalid under
article VII, section 1(a) of the Florida Constitution. Unlike the impact fee cases, McGovern
involved the validation of bonds. There, proposed road improvements and construction of
recreation facilities were to be financed by revenue bonds secured by bridge tolls. The
bridge had already paid for itself, and the tolls were being used for maintenance and opera-
tion costs. 346 So. 2d at 60. The supreme court examined the statutory authority for fund-
ing self-liquidating projects with revenue bonds, and held the proposed scheme invalid. Id.
at 65-66 (discussing Revenue Bond Act of 1953, FLA. STAT. §§ 159.01-.19 (1983)). The court
found that the legislative intent underlying the Revenue Bond Act was that those who di-
rectly benefit from the project should bear a substantial portion of the cost. Conversely,
those who bear the substantial cost should benefit from the project. Id. at 64. The county
failed to show that recreation facilities and road improvements would make any significant
contribution to traffic over the bridge. Therefore, the use of the bridge toll to pay for the
proposed bonds placed an undue burden on island residents and visitors and was invalid. Id.
133. County of Volusia v. State, No. 81-2889-CA-01-B, at 13 (Fla. 7th Cir. Ct. Sept. 10,
1981).
134. See id at 14.
135. See id at 22.
136. See id. at 21. The circuit court concluded that the case was governed by State v.
Halifax Hospital Dist., 159 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1963), because bondholders could compel the
county to use its ad valorem taxing power for repayment of the bonds. See County of Volu-
sia v. State, No. 81-2889-CA-01-B, at 21 (Fla. 7th Cir. Ct. Sept. 10, 1981).
137. See County of Volusia v. State, 417 So. 2d 968 (Fla. 1982).
138. See id. at 971; supra notes 83-88 and accompanying text.
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the non-ad valorem revenues. 139 The majority opined that to main-
tain programs and services that devoted their gross revenues to
bond payments would inevitably result in an increase in ad
valorem taxes to cover the operating costs for continuance of such
programs and services. 140 On the authority of State v. Halifax Hos-
pital District,'4 ' the majority concluded that the proposed bonds
indirectly pledged ad valorem taxes and therefore required voter
approval. 142 Having decided the case on the constitutional issue,
the majority refused to review the validity of the county's using
non-ad valorem regulatory and user fees to finance the jail.
143
The dissent, favoring validation, stated that the court had re-
peatedly upheld similar pledges of non-ad valorem revenues with-
out requiring voter approval. 144 The dissent distinguished State v.
Halifax Hospital District on the ground that pledging gross reve-
nues and promising not to reduce ad valorem taxes levied for hos-
pital maintenance and operations during the life of the bonds re-
quired referendum approval. 145 Volusia County, by comparison,
had not expressly pledged ad valorem taxes to continue the opera-
tion of the programs and services needed to generate non-ad
valorem funds. 41 Moreover, the Volusia County resolution specifi-
cally stated that the bondholders could not compel repayment
through the ad valorem taxing power. 147 The dissent recognized
that the diversion of non-ad valorem funds from general revenue
would probably require an increase in ad valorem taxes to make up
the deficiency. 48 Citing Medley, 49 the dissent concluded that this
139. 417 So. 2d at 971.
140. Id. The majority reached this conclusion notwithstanding the fact that the bond
resolution covenants specifically stated that the bondholders could not compel the levy of ad
valorem taxes. Volusia County, Fla., Resolution No. 81-64 § 13 (July 9, 1981).
141. 159 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1963); see supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
142. 417 So. 2d at 972. The court posited that "[tihat which may not be done directly
may not be done indirectly," but failed explicitly to define the term "indirectly." Id. In-
stead, the majority found that pledging all available non-ad valorem revenues and promising
to do everything necessary to continue to receive those revenues would lead to higher ad
valorem taxes. The court concluded that such a result "amounts to the same thing [as di-
rectly pledging ad valorem taxes]." Id.
143. See id.
144. Id. at 972-75 (Alderman, J., dissenting) (citing State v. Alachua County, 335 So. 2d
554 (Fla. 1976); State v. Tampa Sports Auth., 188 So. 2d 795 (Fla. 1966); Panama City v.
State, 93 So. 2d 608 (Fla. 1957); State v. Monroe County, 81 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 1955); State v.
City of Coral Gables, 72 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 1954); State v. City of Jacksonville, 53 So. 2d 306
(Fla. 1951)),
145. 417 So. 2d at 973.
146. Id.
147. Id.; see supra note 140.
148. 417 So. 2d at 973 (Alderman, J., dissenting).
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incidental effect on ad valorem taxation did not require referen-
dum approval. 5 '
After deciding that a referendum was unnecessary, the dissent
next considered the validity of pledging regulatory and user fees.15" '
In the dissent's opinion, the circuit court mistakenly relied on im-
pact fee cases, which were "inapposite" to bond validation cases. 152
The dissent suggested that the issue was not whether the fees had
a reasonable relationship to constructing a jail, but whether the
fees exceeded the reasonable cost of regulation.1 53 Furthermore, if
a fee were successfully challenged as being unlawful, it would no
longer qualify as a "legally available" non-ad valorem source. 54
Finding nothing in general or specific law that precluded Volusia
County from pledging all legally available non-ad valorem funds,
the dissent concluded that the circuit court erred in finding the
pledge of regulatory and user fees invalid. 55
The Volusia County decision thus added another twist to the
convoluted history of the revenue bond exception to the referen-
dum requirement. The court's opinion raised concern among pub-
lic officials' 5" and bond counsel over the constitutional validity of
outstanding revenue bonds containing pledges and covenants simi-
lar to those proposed by Volusia County.' 57 As a rule, validation
149. See supra notes 83-88 and accompanying text.
150. 417 So. 2d at 973 (Alderman, J., dissenting).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 974. The dissent agreed with the county's argument that the circuit court
had mistakenly extended the impact fee principles to a bond validation case. See Appel-
lant's Initial Brief at 7-20, County of Volusia v. State, 417 So. 2d 968 (Fla. 1982).
153. 417 So. 2d at 973 (Alderman, J., dissenting). The dissent distinguished Volusia
from the impact fee cases by noting that in Volusia there was no challenge that the regula-
tory and user fees exceeded the reasonable cost of regulation or services to be performed. Id.
at 975. The instant case was distinguished from McGovern v. Lee County, 346 So. 2d 58
(Fla. 1977), because, unlike the project in McGovern, the proposed Volusia County jail was
not self-liquidating and, therefore, was not governed by the Revenue Bond Act of 1953, FLA.
STAT. §§ 159.01-.19 (1983). 417 So. 2d at 974 (Alderman, J., dissenting); see supra note 132.
154. 417 So. 2d at 975 (Alderman, J., dissenting). The dissent stated that such individ-
ual challenges to the validity of non-ad valorem revenues were "issues collateral to this bond
validation proceeding." Id. This ambiguous statement leaves doubt about whether such is-
sues are collateral to the supreme court's review of a bond validation, or whether they are
collateral to the circuit court proceeding. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
155. 417 So. 2d at 975 (Alderman, J., dissenting).
156. See, e.g., Orlando Sentinel, June 11, 1982, at A5, col. 3. Orange County Attorney
Tom Wilkes expressed concern that the supreme court's opinion could lead to further inter-
pretations requiring voter approval for revenue bonds backed by non-ad valorem funds. Or-
ange County Comptroller Tom Locker stated that if all revenue bonds required a referen-
dum, "it would bring government's ability to deal with problems to a grinding, screeching
halt."
157. See, e.g., Alachua County, Fla., Ordinance No. 78 (Jan. 20, 1976). This resolution
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proceedings estop future challenges of law or fact; questions about
the constitutional validity of the bonds, however, are not es-
topped. 15 In addition to the concern over the continuing validity
of past bond issues, there was concern about future revenue bond
proposals. The majority's failure to clarify the line between an in-
cidental effect on ad valorem taxes and an indirect pledge of such
taxes cast doubt on the future scope of revenue bond financing.
159
Because ad valorem taxes go into a general fund6 ° for local
government operating expenses, local governments lack guidance
in determining how far they may go in diverting non-ad valorem
revenue from the general fund to revenue bond repayments. In
Medley, the pledge of non-ad valorem funds and the incidental ef-
fect on ad valorem taxes was insufficient to invoke the referendum
requirement. In Halifax Hospital District, the pledge of ad
valorem taxes to operate and maintain the facility, which contrib-
uted its own gross revenues to bond repayment, did require a ref-
erendum. In Volusia County, the pledging of all non-ad valorem
revenue and the covenant to maintain services made voter ap-
proval necessary, even though the taxing power was not pledged
for bond repayment or for maintaining services.
A broad reading of Volusia County, which suggests a retreat
from Medley, would severely restrict the ability of local govern-
ments to finance non-revenue generating projects with revenue
bonds. Such a broad reading could also restrict local governments'
use of their shares of the penny increase in the state sales tax' for
revenue bond payments. Because the sales tax will add significant
contributions to general funds," 2 diversion of the tax could result
concerning $1.9 million in public improvement bonds pledged race track funds and non-ad
valorem funds for repayment. Id. § 12. The non-ad valorem funds were defined as "all funds
of the County derived from sources other than ad valorem taxation, except that portion
thereof constituting Race Track Funds as herein defined." Id. § 2.1 Compare id. with Volu-
sia County, Fla., Resolution No. 81-64 § 2F. Section 2F of the Volusia County Resolution is
quoted supra note 126. The non-ad valorem funds pledged for repayment by both counties
are very similar, yet the Alachua County bonds were validated by the circuit court, and
validation was affirmed by the supreme court. See State v. Alachua County, 335 So. 2d 554
(Fla. 1976).
158. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
160. Municipal funds are either general or special. 15 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 14, §
39.45.
161. Since October 1982, local governments in Florida have received funds equal to
one-half of the one cent increase in sales tax collected in each county. FLA. STAT. § 212.82
(1983) (enacted as 1982 Fla. Laws 154, § 10).
162. See generally JOINT LEGISLATIVE MANAGEMENT COMM. & ADVISORY COUNCIL ON IN-
TERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCIAL INFORMATION HANDBOOK, 8-14
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in an increase of ad valorem taxes to cover the deficiency. This
resulting increase could be considered an indirect pledge of ad
valorem taxes, requiring referendum approval. The supreme
court's denial of 'a rehearing in Volusia County16 3 rendered the
scope of the revenue bond exception doubtful; future bond valida-
tion cases will have to define the scope of the exception.
Volusia County illustrates not only the uncertain scope of the
revenue bond exception but also the consequences of the inflexible
restraints imposed on local government debt management. One
consequence of these restraints is an increased cost of borrowing.
Revenue bonds generally carry higher interest costs than general
obligation bonds with comparable covenants. 16  Because revenue
bonds are less secure than general obligation bonds backed by the
issuer's taxing power,11 5 higher interest rates are necessary to com-
pensate investors for the added risks. 66 Studies have calculated
the interest rate differential between general obligation and reve-
nue bonds to range from 0.25 to 1.25 percent.6 7 For example, with
an interest rate differential of 0.8 percent on a $100 million, forty-
year maturity issue, the annual additional cost would be
$800,000.168 The total additional cost of using revenue bonds rather
than general obligation bonds would be $3,200,000.16'
The issuer of revenue bonds also incurs other additional costs.
The fees of financial advisors and bond counsel increase because
they must analyze the legality and sufficiency of each revenue
source pledged. 170 Furthermore, additional time is required to ne-
gotiate the revenue bond covenants that make the bonds more
marketable by providing adequate security to bondholders.1 7 ' At
the same time, the covenants must give the issuer adequate flex-
(July 1982) (official projections for local government shares of half-cent sales tax in 1982-
1983).
163. 417 So. 2d 968, reh'g denied, 417 So. 2d 968 (Fla. 1982).
164. A. HEINS, CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTIONS AGAINST STATE DEBT, 36 (1963); Quirk &
Wein, A Short Constitutional History of Entities Commonly Known as Authorities, 56
CORNELL L. REV. 521, 569 n.286 (1971).
165. See generally Note, Creditors' Remedies in Municipal Default, 1976 DUKE L.J.
1363 (discussing limitations on general obligation bondholders' remedies in case of default).
166. In 1957, the average interest cost for state general obligation bonds was 3.22%,
while that for state revenue bonds was 3.78%. A. HEINS, supra note 164, at 39.
167. Gelfand, supra note 4, at 560.
168. A. HEINS, supra note 164, at 48-49.
169. Id.
170. Rankin, Osburn & Rogers, Municipal Bonds and Property Tax Limitations, 9




ibility to operate the facility and to anticipate future needs.'72
The referendum requirement also constrains local government
officials in assessing the current capital needs of the community
and developing rational debt policies to meet those needs on a pri-
ority basis. A community could more readily finance low priority
bridge construction that would be secured by tolls than it could
finance a pressing community need for a non-revenue generating
facility such as a jail. A putative purpose of the referendum re-
quirement is to prevent public managers from over-issuing general
obligation bonds to finance projects that create attractive short-
term results, but unmanageable long-term debt. Studies indicate,
however, that managers with unrestricted borrowing power have
been no less responsible than managers with restricted borrowing
powers. 73
As Volusia County demonstrates, voters often are unaware of
the financial consequences of their decisions. In that case, general
obligation bonds, with their lower interest costs, woaild have been
the preferable debt instrument for financing the jail.' Revenue
bonds, though carrying increased interest costs, would still spread
the debt burden among taxpayers for the life of the bonds.'75 Once
these options were eliminated, the county considered pay-as-you-
go financing of the jail, using revenue from the penny increase in
the state sales tax.' 70 Ironically, voters unwilling to incur part of
the cost of general obligation financing would ultimately bear the
entire cost with pay-as-you-go financing.
In addition to revenue bond and pay-as-you-go financing, an-
other method of financing capital improvements without voter ap-
proval is by special assessments.1 77 The supreme court consistently
has maintained that assessments for special benefits are similar to,
172. Id.
173. A. HEINS, supra note 164, at 59.
174. Ironically, ten years ago Volusia County could have financed a new jail without
voter approval under the essential government needs exception. See Tapers v. Pichard, 124
Fla. 549, 169 So. 39 (1936); see also supra note 112.
175. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
176. Daytona Beach Morning Journal, June 11, 1982, at B1, col. 1. The county expected
to receive $3 million in additional revenue from its annual share of the state sales tax in-
crease. Id.
177. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 6 provides .in part:
(a) Every person who has the legal or equitable title to real estate and main-
tains thereon the permanent residence of the owner, or another legally or natu-
rally dependent upon the owner, shall be exempt from taxation thereon, except
assessments for special benefits, up to the assessed valuation of five thousand
dollars . . ..
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but not the same as, ad valorem taxes.17s An ad valorem tax is an
annual levy for the general operation of local government and is
measured by the assessed valuation of property 4nd current mil-
lage rates. 179 Assessments for special benefits are fixed amounts as-
sessed against benefited property for specific improvements; these
assessments are apportioned on a front footage or acreage basis
without regard to ad valorem valuation.'8 °
Because special assessments levied for repayment of bonds are
distinguishable from ad valorem taxes, voter approval is not re-
quired.18 1 For example, in Lake Howell Water and Reclamation
District v. State,'s assessments were pledged for revenue bonds to
finance drainage and reclamation improvements within the dis-
trict. The supreme court stated that the special assessments repre-
sented a fixed lien upon property in the drainage district.' Once
the special assessment was paid, the property owner was not re-
sponsible for any future payments on the drainage bonds.8 4 If the
bonds were supported by ad valorem taxes, however, the property
owner would be subject to recurring ad valorem levies until the
bonds were fully paid. 8 5 The court held that, because assessments
for special benefits are not ad valorem taxes, the drainage bonds
did not require voter approval. 8
The supreme court has also upheld the validity of street im-
provement bonds that were issued without voter approval and
were secured by special assessments against the private property to
be benefited. 18 7 With one-fourth of Florida's roads in need of re-
surfacing or repair,'88 this device for circumventing the referendum
requirement may be increasingly used. In effect, capital improve-
ments directly benefiting property may be financed with bonds
paid by "assessments" based on property acreage or frontage, and
no referendum is necessary. If, however, such bonds are financed
178. See Fisher v. Board of County Comm'rs, 84 So. 2d 572, 579 (Fla. 1956); City of
Fort Lauderdale v. Carter, 71 So. 2d 260, 261 (Fla. 1954); City of Orlando v. State, 67 So. 2d
673, 674-75 (Fla. 1953). See generally Note, Special District Taxation, 13 U. FLA. L. REV.
531, 548-51 (1960) (discussing homestead exemption and special assessments).
179. Fisher v. Board of County Comm'rs, 84 So. 2d 572, 579 (Fla. 1956).
180. Id.; Klemm v. Davenport, 100 Fla. 627, 631, 129 So. 904, 907 (1930).
181. See cases cited supra note 178.
182. 268 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 1972).




187. See, e.g., City of Orlando v. State, 67 So. 2d 673 (Fla. 1953).
188. Gainesville Sun, Oct. 8, 1982, at A4, col. 1.
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by "taxes" based on property valuation, then voter approval is
required.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
The 1968 Florida Constitution expanded the home rule powers
of both counties and municipalities by giving local governments
more control over local affairs.18 9 Since then, implementation of
home rule powers has resulted in a functional and structural
strengthening of local government.19 Noticeably missing, however,
has been a concomitant delegation of "fiscal home rule" powers.191
Fiscal home rule would allow elected local officials to make the
financial decisions for the municipality.1 92 Although several consti-
tutional provisions currently inhibit the fiscal home rule powers of
local government, the referendum requirement of article VII, sec-
tion 12 remains the major restraint. 93
One way to increase the fiscal home rule powers of local gov-
ernments would be to amend section 12 to allow a permissive,
rather than a mandatory, referendum for general obligation
bonds.1 94 Under a permissive referendum system, after the gov-
189. See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § l(f)-(g) comment. See generally Sparkman, The His-
tory and Status of Local Government Powers in Florida, 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 271 (1973)
(concluding that continuing resistance to home rule has hindered the success of attempts to
reorder legislative power relationships); Note, Charter County Government in Florida: Past
Litigation and Future Proposals, 33 U. FLA. L. REV. 505 (1981) (recommending further de-
lineation of the legislative intent behind expansion of home rule powers and harmonization
of the overlapping philosophies of county and municipal home rule). The concept of "home
rule" involves the transfer of certain state governmental powers to local governments in
matters of local concern. Id. at 508.
190. Morell, supra note 178, at 1-2.
191. Id.
192. Gelfand, supra note 4, at 586.
193. See supra note 31.
194. A 1961 study conducted by the U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations arrived at a similar conclusion in one of their five recommendations:
The Commission recommends that authority to issue bonds should be le-
gally vested in the governing bodies of local governments, subject to a permissive
referendum only, on petition, and with participation in any such referendum
available to all eligible local voters and the results determined-except under
unusual circumstances-by a simple majority vote on the question.
ACIR, LOCAL DEBT, supra note 13, at 72; see Bowmar, supra note 22, at 899; Schilling,
Griggs & Ebert, supra note 36, at 556-57 (additional recommendations for permissive
referendums).
The permissive referendum concept is consistent with the Model County and Municipal
Bond Law. The introduction to the Model Law states that a permissive referendum "tends
to stimulate more critical alertness on the part of the electorate than does the provision for
mandatory referenda-which frequently receive only perfunctory attention." NATIONAL MU-
NICIPAL LEAGUE, A MODEL COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL BOND LAW ix (1953).
19841
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
erning body adopted a bond resolution, electors would have a set
time period within which to file a petition requesting a referendum
on the bond issue.19 5 The bond resolution would then become ef-
fective only when approved by a majority vote at a special election
or at the next general election. Detailed notice of proposed bond
issues"9 ' and open meeting requirements 9 7 could restrain potential
borrowing abuses. The political process would serve as a further
restraint, as the local media subjects local government action to
intense scrutiny, and elected officials seeking reelection must an-
swer regularly to their constituents. 98
In addition to procedural and political restraints, the munici-
pal bond market1 99 could provide a further check on potential
fiscal irresponsibility under a permissive referendum system.
Under current market procedure, financial advisors 00 carefully
195. Referendum petitions would require signatures numbering at least 20% of the
votes cast in the last gubernatorial election.
196. E.g., WIs. STAT. § 67.05(3) (1981) (providing for notice of bond resolution to be
published at least twice a week for sixty days in the local newspaper).
197. E.g., id. §§ 19.81-.98 (open meeting requirements for state and local governmental
bodies).
198. See Schilling, Griggs & Ebert, supra note 36, at 556.
199. Some analysts suggest that the structure of the municipal bond market is in need
of reform. A narrow base of investors who need tax-exempt income, combined with increas-
ing demand for long-term borrowing, could lead to tighter credit and higher municipal bond
interest rates. Bagwell, Evans & Nielsen, supra note 8, at 216. One proposal suggests the
creation of a taxable bond option (TBO). Id. at 236-38. With TBOs, local governments could
issue bonds that are not exempt from federal taxation and could receive a subsidy from the
federal government to offset the higher interest costs. Id. at 236. Proponents claim the TBO
concept would broaden the range of municipal bond investors. Id. For further discussion of
reform proposals and their effect on the bond market, see Article, Reform of the Municipal
Bond Market: Alternatives to Tax-Exempt Financing, 15 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 233
(1980).
200. The local government issuer employs financial advisors to analyze the credit needs
of the community, develop a bond issue, assist in selecting an underwriter, and work with
the rating agencies. PUBLIC SECURITIES ASS'N, supra note 11, at 34. In Florida, local govern-
ments use various methods for choosing financial advisors. Some municipalities use one
financial advisor for all issues in the belief that an advisor who knows the status and details
of that community's debt offers better services. Other local governments accept financial
advisors chosen by the finance officer or a committee of local officials. Large governments
develop a long-term relationship with advisors specializing in the type of bond issued.
ACIR, FLA. LOCAL DEBT, supra note 3, at 52.
The duties of the financial advisors overlap with those of the dealer, who engages in the
underwriting, trading, and sale of municipal bonds. PUBLIC SECURITIES Ass'N, supra note 11,
at 35. In 1980, there were approximately 1800 dealers and dealer banks registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission, with about one-third of those being active. Id. at 65.
Federal law prohibits commercial banks from underwriting municipal revenue bonds. 12
U.S.C. § 378 (1976).
Underwriting-the purchase of municipal bonds for resale to the public-is done on a
competitive or negotiated basis, depending on the type of the bonds. Greenberg, supra note
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scrutinize the economic and administrative health of a community,
while bond counsel2"1 assures the legal sufficiency of the proposed
issue. The rating agencies further analyze the municipality's past
and present debt service capacity. 02 Dealers and underwriters use
rating agency data,20 3 along with opinions from their own research
staffs, in submitting bids for the proposed general obligation
bonds, with the issuer choosing the bid with the lowest interest
cost. Because underwriters must pay their bid price regardless of
later success in reselling the bonds to investors,0 4 they must care-
fully evaluate both the bonds' marketability and the issuer's fiscal
capacity.
If the interest cost of the proposed bond issue reflected dimin-
9, at 357-61. Bonds issued by competitive bids are awarded to the dealer who submits the
lowest net interest cost bid to the issuer. Underwriters form a group or syndicate to deter-
mine interest rates, time structure, and yields of the bonds to investors. Id. at 357. If a
dealer believes the interest rate is inappropriately priced, making resale of the bonds diffi-
cult, that dealer may withdraw from the syndicate. Id. at 357-58. Most general obligation
bonds are underwritten by a competitive bidding process, with both dealers and dealer
banks participating. PUBLIC SECURITIES Ass'N, supra note 11, at 36. For a discussion of gen-
eral obligation bonds, see supra note 48 and accompanying text. With negotiated offerings,
there is no competitive bidding, and the issuer chooses one syndicate to sell the bonds.
Local governments use negotiated offerings when issuing revenue bonds. PUBLIC SECURITIES
ASS'N, supra note 11, at 36. For a discussion of revenue bonds, see supra note 49 and accom-
panying text.
201. Municipal bonds are acccmpanied by a legal opinion of the bond counsel that ad-
dresses two main issues: (1) whether the bond resolution authorizing the sale of the bond
satisfies the requirements of the state constitution, statutes, case law, local charters, and
enabling legislation; and (2) whether the interest income from the bonds is exempt from
federal taxation. PUBLIC SECURITIES ASS'N, supra note 11, at 32. The bond counsel compiles
all documents that verify the legality of an issue into a "transcript of proceedings." This
transcript contains the documents required by bondholders to enforce their rights under the
bond. Id. While the bond counsel normally drafts the bond ordinance and transcript, the
local attorney is still considered the representative of the interests of the local government.
ACIR, FLA. LOCAL DEBT, supra note 3, at 54.
202. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
203. For a discussion of problems that arise when financial advisors who assist in devel-
oping the bond issue also act as underwriters by purchasing the bonds, see Magnusson,
Municipal Bond Buying by Fiscal Advisors, 15 Bus. LAW. 393 (1960).
204. Greenberg, supra note 9, at 356. Two types of syndicate accounts prevail in differ-
ent parts of the country. In an "Eastern syndicate," which is commonly used in major trade
centers of the east and west coasts, the dealer members of the syndicate are undivided as to
sales and liability. PUBLIC SECURITIES ASS'N, supra note 11, at 69. Because an Eastern ac-
count is undivided as to sales and liability, syndicate members can trade any of the bonds in
the account as long as the bonds are available, but they will be liable for a proportionate
share of any bonds remaining unsold. Id. at 69-70. In a "Western syndicate," which is
predominantly used throughout the midwestern states, participating underwriters are as-
signed a portion of the bonds. A Western syndicate is divided only as to liability, not as to
sales; therefore, a syndicate member's liability terminates upon selling the assigned portion
of bonds. Id. at 70.
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ished financial capacity of the issuer, then the bond issue could be
reconsidered by mandatory referendum. The standard reference
might be an average of net interest costs of the issuer's immedi-
ately preceding general obligation bonds.20 5 Interest costs that ex-
ceed a specified percentage above this average would require a
mandatory referendum. In keeping with fiscal home rule princi-
ples, these standards should be determined by the local governing
body, not by a uniform state statute.
Since the New York City crisis, when the mixing of different
accounting bases concealed mounting deficits, '0 6 there has been a
recognized need for standardized municipal accounting proce-
dures.0 7 The Florida Legislature recently responded to this need
by enacting mandatory guidelines for annual financial reports by
local governments. 0 8 The guidelines require that reports be pre-
pared according to generally accepted government accounting prin-
ciples and that they follow United States Bureau of Census stan-
dards for providing information necessary to assess the financial
condition of local governments.20 9 This upgrading in financial in-
formation procedures could both assist bond analysts in calculating
accurate interest rates and aid voters in deciding whether to peti-
tion for a bond referendum.210
Several studies have suggested the creation of a state adminis-
trative agency to oversee local government financing, particularly
the issuance of bonds.211 Such an agency could, however, result in a
backdoor intrusion on fiscal home rule. In Louisiana, for example,
approval by a state agency is required before a local government
205. The U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations recommends that
states regulate local government long-term borrowing by setting statewide interest cost stan-
dards indexed to current interest rates for high quality municipal securities. ACIR, LOCAL
DEBT, supra note 13, at 77-82. Such an approach, however, would not accurately reflect
individual community debt capacity.
206. Gelfand, supra note 4, at 584.
207. See generally Lodal, Improving Local Government Financial Information Sys-
tems, 1976 DUKE L.J. 1133 (arguing for broadbased reform in local governments' financial
management information systems); Petersen, Doty, Forbes & Bourque, Searching for Stan-
dards: Disclosure in the Municipal Securities Market, 1976 DUKE L.J. 1177 (discussing dis-
closure by municipal issuers and the possible applicability of federal securities laws to mu-
nicipal securities transactions.
208. See FLA. STAT. § 218.32 (1983).
209. Id. § 218.32(1)(b).
210. Upgrading financial information systems would also assist municipal managers in
planning, control, management, and external reporting. Lodal, supra note 210, at 1138.
211. See, e.g., ACIR, FLA. LOCAL DEBT, supra note 3, at 36; ACIR, LOCAL DEBT, supra
note 13, at 82; Gelfand, supra note 4, at 601-06.
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can issue bonds.212 Other states have created state boards with lim-
ited advisory powers with respect to local borrowing practices.213
Fortunately, Florida followed the latter approach, by establishing
in 1979 the Division of Bond Finance, which serves as a clearing
house for information on all local bond issues.21 4 Because a default
on bonds in one city could adversely affect bond interest rates paid
by other local governments, complete descriptions of all outstand-
ing bonds and recent issues must be reported to the Division of
Bond Finance. 21 5 Failure to comply with this statutory require-
ment could result in the state's withholding funds from the negli-
gent local government.
216
A final restraint on possible abuses under a permissive refer-
endum system is the limitation on local governments' taxing pow-
ers found in article VII, section 9 of the Florida Constitution.
2 17
Under section 9, counties, municipalities, and school districts are
limited to maximum ad valorem levies of ten mills each. 1 a Al-
though this millage cap is contrary to fiscal home rule principles,
the current climate of property tax revolt makes its repeal un-
likely.219 Furthermore, retention of section 9 could facilitate the fu-
212. LA. CONST. art. VI, § 33(A). If the bonds are issued to refinance outstanding in-
debtedness at the same or at a lower rate of interest, they need not be authorized at an
election if the indebtedness is paid or cancelled on delivery of the funds or if authorized
funds are set aside explicitly for that purpose. Id.
213. The Virginia Legislature created a state commission on local debt composed of the
Auditor of Public Accounts, State Treasurer, State Tax Commissioner, Comptroller, Assis-
tant Secretary for Financial Policy, and two other members appointed by the Governor. The
commission, only upon request, advises local officials in planning, preparing, and marketing
municipal bonds. VA. CODE § 15.1-173 (1981).
214. See FLA. STAT. § 218.37 (1983) (originally enacted as 1979 Fla. Laws 79-183, § 6).
The duties of the Division include providing information on planning bond issues, commis-
sioning studies on reducing the costs of bond issues, recommending changes in the law to
improve the sale and servicing of local bonds, and providing the Department of Banking and
Finance with current information on outstanding bonds and new issues. Id. § 218.37(1)(a),
(d), (e), (h). The statute also provides for creation of an advisory council consisting of repre-
sentatives from municipal banking, local government units, and the general public. Id. §
218.37(3)(a)-(c).
215. FLA. STAT § 218.38(1)(a) (1983).
216. Id. § 218.38(3)(a).
217. See FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 9.
218. See supra note 26.
219. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text. Recent bond elections, however, indi-
cate that voters may be retreating somewhat from the tax revolt stance of the 1970's. Wall
St. J., Nov. 4, 1982, at 44, col. 1. More than three billion dollars in municipal bonds were
approved in elections in November 1982. While New Jersey voters approved a $170 million
jail bond proposal, Rhode Island voters rejected an $8.5 million prison bond issue. One mar-
ket analyst felt voters recognized the need for capital improvements and realized that "you
get what you pay for." Id. Another attributed the New Jersey bond's success to the high
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ture amendment of section 12 by giving voters constitutional assur-
ance that property taxes would not escalate as a result of the
permissive referendum for general obligation bonds.
Despite the advantages of a permissive referendum system re-
strained by procedural requirements, the political process, the
bond market, and the constitution, the tax revolt climate may nev-
ertheless inhibit the legislature and the electorate in approving
amendment of section 12. In that event, the courts should assume
responsibility for implementing fiscal home rule powers by contin-
uing to recognize the revenue bond exception to the referendum
requirement. Although section 12 offers illusory protection22 ° by
requiring voter approval for only general obligation bonds, this in-
consistency should not be remedied by bringing revenue bonds
within the scope of the referendum requirement. Such a proposal
would contradict fifty years of precedent through which the reve-
nue bond exception evolved and would severely restrict local
government financing of capital improvements.22' Instead, the
courts should liberally interpret the revenue bond exception and
should allow the political process and the municipal bond market
to function as restraints.
Expansion of the revenue bond exception should effectively
halt the encroachment on local governments' discretionary power
to pledge non-ad valorem sources for non-revenue generating facil-
ities. Accordingly, to prevent such encroachment, Volusia County
should be narrowly interpreted as merely requiring local govern-
ments to specify which non-ad valorem sources have been
pledged.2 2 Local officials should have the discretion to allocate
general fund revenues on a priority basis. For example, public
managers should be able to eliminate nonessential programs from
the operating budget in order to fund bond payments for critical
projects, such as federally mandated jail improvements. This dis-
unemployment rate, with voters believing government spending would create new jobs. Id.
220. See supra notes 113-18 and accompanying text.
221. Assuming that the capital improvements are necessary to provide adequate com-
munity services, they will have to be made at some future point. When construction finally
occurs, the cost is likely to be higher than it would have been under the original schedule.
Furthermore, inadequate maintenance on existing capital plants will increase the overall
cost of maintaining and replacing such plants.
222. If Volusia County remains law, the issuers should refrain from promising to main-
tain programs and services that generate revenue, as this was one aspect of the case that
troubled the supreme court. The courts should not interpret Volusia County as requiring
voter approval when large amounts of non-ad valorem sources are diverted from municipal
operating expenses to revenue bond payments. Instead, the courts should consider the prin-
ciples of Medley as unaffected by Volusia County.
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cretion should include allowing local governments to use the penny
increase in the state sales tax for revenue bond pledges. 223
If the supreme court rejects this more liberal interpretation of
the use of non-ad valorem funds, then it should at least define the
boundary between an incidental effect on and an indirect pledge of
ad valorem taxes.224 In defining that boundary, the court should
refrain from creating a test that makes the fiscal feasibility of pro-
posed bonds and the economic sufficiency of each pledge condi-
tions for validation of a bond issue. As the supreme court has con-
sistently ruled, questions of business policy and judgment related
to proposed bond issues should be resolved by the issuer, not the
225judiciary.
Any future questions about the validity of pledging regulatory
and user fees for revenue bonds should follow the approach of the
dissent in Volusia County.2 26 If the fees do not exceed the reasona-
ble cost of regulation, local governments should be able to pledge
such fees even if the project is unrelated to the source of the
fees.227 Thus, for example, a scheme that pledges tolls from a
bridge that has paid for itself to finance a recreation center would
be invalid. The invalidity would not result because bridge tolls are
unrelated to recreation centers; rather, continuing to charge bridge
users a toll that exceeds bridge operating costs would be an unrea-
sonable fee for using the bridge.
V. CONCLUSION
An examination of the restrictions on local government debt
financing imposed by the referendum requirement of article VII,
section 12 of the Florida Constitution reveals that the revenue
bond exception to the referendum requirement has, over time, in-
creased in scope and use by local governments. As a result, section
12 has become an anachronism offering only illusory protection
against irresponsible debt financing. The supreme court's recent
attempt to narrow the revenue bond exception has only resulted in
confusion. The uncertain future of use of revenue bond financing,
combined with the continuing referendum restrictions on general
obligation bonds, has curtailed local governments' ability to
develop flexible, efficient debt policies.
223. See supra notes 161-62 and accompanying text.
224. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
225. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 144-55 and accompanying text.
227. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
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To promote fiscal home rule principles, the Florida Legislature
and voters should amend section 12 to allow permissive referenda
for general obligation bonds. Local governments' fiscal integrity
would be maintained through the political process and the munici-
pal bond market. In the alternative, the courts must allow greater
flexibility to local governments in pledging non-ad valorem sources
for financing both revenue and non-revenue generating facilities.
Such an implementation of fiscal home rule powers would promote
the efficient use of both general obligation and revenue bond
financing to meet the present and future capital needs of commu-
nities in Florida.
